University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Volume 20
1987

A Proposal to Cap Tort Liability: Avoiding the Pitfalls of
Heightened Rationality
Richard S. Kuhl
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr
Part of the Legal Remedies Commons, Legislation Commons, Medical Jurisprudence Commons, and
the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard S. Kuhl, A Proposal to Cap Tort Liability: Avoiding the Pitfalls of Heightened Rationality, 20 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 1215 (1987).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol20/iss4/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

A PROPOSAL TO CAP TORT
LIABILITY: A VOIDING THE
PITFALLS OF HEIGHTENED
RATIONALITY

In a nation dependent upon liability protection, dramatic and
highly publicized increases in the cost of insurance have created
a difficult situation for many members of society. 1 Manufacturers are abandoning entire product lines, 2 workers are struggling
to find day-care services for their children,3 producers of lifesaving vaccines are discontinuing production,' and government entities are foregoing liability coverage-all as a result of extraordinary rises in insurance premiums.'~
Constituents have besieged state and federal lawmakers with
demands for immediate action against the spreading crisis. Legislators have reacted by statutorily limiting the noneconomic
damages that a plaintiff can recover in a legal action. 6 In view of
1. See Gest & Work, Sky-High Damage Suits, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 27,
1986, at 35; Greene, The Tort Reform Quagmire, FORBES, Aug. 11, 1986, at 76; King, A
Catastrophic Year Has Airline Insurance Rocketing, Bus. WK., Jan. 20, 1986, at 30; Lacayo, The Malpractice Blues, TIME, Feb. 24, 1986, at 60.
2. See Dee, Bloodbath, ENTERPRISES, Mar./Apr. 1986, at 3; Businesses Struggling to
Adapt as Insurance Crisis Spreads, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1986, at 33 [hereinafter Businesses Struggling].
3. See generally Child Care: The Emerging Insurance Crisis: Hearings Before the
Select Comm. on Children, Youth, and Families, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985); Businesses Struggling, supra note 2, at 33.
4. See Availability and Affordability Problems in Liability Insurance: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Business, Trade, and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1985) [hereinafter Senate
Hearing] (statement of Rep. Porter) (DPT manufacturers stopping production); Drug
Firm's Hands Tied; Users Suffer, Det. News, Oct. 15, 1986, at A4, col. 1.
5. See Blodgett, Premium Hikes Stun Municipalities, 72 A.B.A. J., July 1, 1986, at
48; DePalma, Liability Insurance: Hard to Get and Costly, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1986,
§ 11, at 1, col. 5.
6. · See, e.g., Act effective June 11, 1986, § 1, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 139 (codified
at ALASKA STAT.·§ 09.17.010 (Supp. 1987)); Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch.
86-160, § 59, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 755 (codified at FLA. STAT.§ 768.80 (1987)); Act of May
27, 1986, ch. 639, § 1, 1986 Md. Laws 2347, 2350 (codified as Mo. CTs. & Jun. Paoc. CooE
ANN. § 11-108 (Supp. 1987)); Act of June 6, 1986, ch. 227, § 13, 1986 N.H. Laws 475, 485
(codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (Supp. 1987)); Act of Apr. 4, 1986, ch. 305,
§ 301, 1986 Wash. Laws 1354, 1357 (codified at WASH. REV. CooE § 4.56.250 (Supp.
1988)).
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expressed opposition to the statutes, litigants will predictably
seek legislative or judicial repeal of the limitations. 7
These limitations represent a second wave of legislation enacted in response to a crisis in affordable insurance coverage.
Over the past ten years, a substantial number of states enacted
limitations on medical malpractice awards when rising costs and
limited insurance availability threatened insurance coverage for
doctors and hospitals. 8 Studies indicate that these limitations
helped slow the growth of malpractice insurance premiums
where they were enacted. 9 Legislators' efforts were frequently
foiled, however, as states had their medical malpractice award
limitations declared unconstitutional under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 10
This Note sets forth a model statute that limits high damage
awards, yet will withstand the rigors of judicial scrutiny. After
presenting a brief background of the medical malpractice crisis
in Part I, Part II outlines the standards of equal protection review that the courts are presently using. The Note then focuses
on the constitutional challenges to caps on medical malpractice
liability in Part III. Part IV discusses the values and interests
that were found to be dispositive in the courts' decisions. Finally, after analyzing the criteria that must be met to ensure
that a legislative limitation will survive judicial scrutiny, Part V
proposes a statute to circumscribe noneconomic damage awards.
I.

BACKGROUND

The causes of the crisis and the legislative means employed to
combat these evils must be delineated to understand properly
the equal protection concerns raised by the damage caps. Furthermore, an overview of these causes provides a foundation for
ascertaining the rationales for legislative action and the resultant judicial reactions.
7. See Browning, Doctors and Lawyers Face Off, AB.A. J., July 1, 1986, at 38;
Schwartz, Should There Be a Cap on Personal Injury Awards?, 64 MICH. B.J. 135 (1985).
8. See Smith, Battling a Receding Tort Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical
Malpractice Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 195 (1985). Professor Smith's review of the constitutionality of malpractice limits focuses on the differences between state and federal equal
protection standards of review. This Note takes the position that although there may be
distinctions between the two positions, the state decisions and analyses are consistent
with equal protection principles as presently employed by the Supreme Court.
9. See P. DANZON, THE FREQUENCY AND SEVERITY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
(Inst. For Civil Justice, Rand Corp. R-2870-ICJ, 1982).
10. See infra notes 54-86 and accompanying text.
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Factors Leading to the Crisis

Although the impact of rising insurance rates is considerable,
the involved parties are still vehemently debating the origins of
the insurance problem. 11 In general, several factors are cited as
the main contributors to the crisis. First, the insurance companies blame aberrant behavior in the civil justice system, evidenced by unfair and capricious jury awards, for the crisis. 12 Accusing the courts of running a get-rich-quick lottery for the
masses, 13 insurance underwriters claim that the unpredictability
of excessive liabilities has forced their companies either to raise
premiums to protect themselves against potentially prohibitive
damage awards, or to withdraw totally from insuring high risk
activities. 14
A second factor contributing to the current insurance crisis is
the shrinking reinsurance market. Reinsurers provide insurance
for primary coverage carriers by reimbursing the primary's
payouts that exceed a specified amount. If insurance companies
cannot obtain reinsurance for certain risks, they will not insure
those risks. The reinsurance market is drying up for the same
reasons that the primary insurance market is contracting: the
unpredictability of the judicial system and the diminishing capacity to underwrite risks. 111
11. See Franck, Tort Reform Update, 64 MICH. B.J. 1014 (1986); Perlam, Should
Pain and Suffering Awards Haue Statutory Limits: Don't Punish the Injured, A.B.A. J.,
May 1, 1986, at 34; Rust, ABA Rejects AMA Tort Reform Plan, 3 MED. BENEFITS 22-27
(1986).
12. See Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of William C. Wyer, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce); Wright, Why Tort Reform is Needed, BENCH & B. MINN., Mar.
1986, at 20.
13. Examples of seemingly outlandish jury awards abound. In one jury trial, a plaintiff was recompensed for the loss of a prize bull that died as a result of an accidental
spraying of pesticides. The jury awarded the owner $1.5 million in compensatory damages and $7 million in punitive damages.
When a 75-year old welder died of a heart attack while at a restaurant, his widow
brought suit against his former employer, Getty Oil. Five months before the heart attack,
the deceased had been severely burned while at work. Determining that the heart attack
was caused by the stress of the burns, the court awarded the plaintiff $3.7 million in
compensatory damages and $24,999,999 in punitive damages.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. lost a case where an obese man claimed his heart attack was
caused by a lawn mower starter cord that was too difficult to pull. The jury awarded one
million dollars in damages. Greene, The Hanging Judges of Business, FORBES, Apr. 7,
1986, at 62; Taylor, Is It The Best Little Plaintiff's City in Texas?, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 8,
1986, at 6, col. 1.
14. See Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 4 (statement of William C. Wyer, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce); Smith, supra note 8.
15. See Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 93 (statement of Mindy Pollack, Assistant
Gen. Counsel, Reinsurance Ass'n of Am.).
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A third reason for high insurance costs results, ironically, from
insurers charging too little in the past. 16 Underwriters sold their
policies at below-cost levels to build fiscal volume, hoping to
cover casualty losses through earnings from high yield investments. As investment income declined and liability claims rose,
the insurance companies were caught with insufficient funds to
cover the mounting demands for indemnification. 17 Consequently, the insurance companies either had to raise their premiums to cover potential losses or completely reassess their involvement in high risk markets. 18

B.

Two Legislative Responses

State legislatures recently have attempted several solutions to
the crisis, 19 frequently turning to limitations on compensatory
awards. 2 ° Florida and Washington illustrate two legislative efforts to restrain tort liability awards that may create significantly different results.
In a comprehensive package, Florida lawmakers passed a
straight $450,000 limitation upon the total noneconomic damages that any plaintiff can recover in a negligence or breach of
16. See F. BELLOTrI, J. VAN DEKAMP, L. THORBURG, J. MATrOX, C. BROWN & B. LAFOLLETE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY AND UNAFFORDABILITY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 10-16 (1986); Molotsky, Drive to Limit Product Liability Grows as Consumer Groups Object, N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1986, § 1, at 32, col. 1.
17. See generally Senate Hearing, supra note 4; R. Fleming, Final Report to Governor James J. Blanchard on the Subject of Health Care Provider Malpractice and Malpractice Insurance (Dec. 17, 1985) (copy on file with U. MICH. J.L. REF.).
18.
The capacity constraints of the insurance industry also [contribute] to shortages
of liability coverage. The industry generally follows a rule-of-thumb known as
the 'Kennedy formula' which theorizes that premiums should not exceed surplus
by more than 2 to 3 times. Because underwriting losses are partially paid from
surplus, the ratio helps to ensure that carriers do not take on too much business
in periods when surplus is low. In 1984, many insurance carriers experienced
erosions of surplus due to heavy losses and lower investment earnings. As a result, in 1985, many carriers are turning away new business and more carefully
selecting those businesses whom they wish to retain.
Senate Hearing, supra note 4, at 21 (statement of Frank S. Swan, Chief Counsel for
Advocacy, Office of Advocacy, Small Business Admin.).
19. Examples of state action are (1) restricting punitive damages, (2) eliminating the
collateral source rule, (3) ending joint and several liability, (4) restricting the use of contingent fees, and (5) modifying statutes of repose. Phillips, To Be or Not To Be: Reff.ections on Changing Our Tort System, 46 Mo. L. REV. 55, 56-62 (1986).
20. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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warranty action. 21 Noneconomic damages are defined in Florida
as awards designed "to compensate for pain and suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, mental impairment, mental
anguish, disfigurement, [and] loss of capacity for enjoyment of
life. " 22
The main goal of the Florida law was to eliminate potentially
aberrant and excessive jury awards in order to provide insurers
with an objective basis for determining their premium rates. 23
The legislature also wanted to ensure that victims were fully reimbursed for all compensable injuries. By establishing a top rate
of $450,000, Florida legislators ensured that the vast majority of
victims were not precluded from fully recovering for injuries. 24
At the same time, the legislators declared a point at which speculation ceased and society's interests in promoting the continuance of affordable insurance coverage took precedence.
In the State of Washington, legislators took a different path
by enacting a liability cap that limited a claimant's recovery for
noneconomic damages to an amount "determined by multiplying
0.43 by the average annual wage and by the life expectancy of
the person incurring noneconomic damages. " 25 The Washington
legislature's stated goals were to provide' an objective standard
by which insurance companies could predict potential risks with
greater accuracy when establishing their premium rates, to provide full compensation for the economic costs incurred by the
plaintiff, and to restrain jury reactions to the highly speculative
costs of pain and suffering. 26
A hypothetical example best demonstrates the differences between the Florida and Washington statutes. Falling debris from
a construction site strikes and badly injures a sixty-year old woman. As a result of the injury, the woman is deeply depressed,
21. Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986, ch. 86-160, § 59, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 755
(codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (1987)).
22. Id. § 60, 1986 Fla. Laws at 755 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (1987)).
23. Id. § 2, 1986 Fla. Laws at 699.
24. The legislatures have fixed the monetary figure for liability limitation at what is
essentially an arbitrary number. S. REP. No. 422, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 99 (1986).
Known factors, however, can be used to provide a working framework for legislatures.
The available figures for personal injury awards show that in New York the average settlement is $31,740. Id. at 6. In a five-year study in Greenville County, South Carolina,
83.6% of all personal injury awards were below $10,000, and only 1.7% exceeded
$100,000. Id. at 110. Although generalizations from these figures are tenuous, it is fair to
say that the legislative caps will allow equitable compensation for the vast majority of
cases.
25. Act of Apr. 4, 1986, ch. 305, § 301(2), 1986 Wash. Laws 1354, 1357 (codified at
WASH. REV. CooE § 4.56.250 (Supp. 1988)).
26. Id.
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scarred, and in severe pain for two years. Under the Florida statute, drawing upon its past experiences to evaluate the severity of
the women's pain and the depth of her depression, the trier of
fact could determine that the woman had suffered noneconomic
losses of $250,000 during that period.
In Washington, a jury may reach the same results as the Florida jury, but its award will be cut in half under the statutory
formula. Because the average life expectancy of the woman is
only seventy-five years, taking 0.43 of the average wage, $8060 in
this case, over her fifteen year life expectancy would limit her
recovery to $120,900. The results of a number of such scenarios
indicate that Washington's statute produces a more favorable
climate for defendants than does Florida's. The consequence of
such discrepancies among states is not only that victims in comparable circumstances will receive sharply divergent awards, but
also that there may be an increase in forum shopping by plaintiffs who wish to avoid such restraints on their interests.

C.

Classifications Under the Caps on Liability

By placing a ceiling on the damages that a tort victim can recover, state legislatures implicitly established separate classifications between victims who are fully compensated for their injuries and those who will not be fully compensated. 27 Recoveries
by victims who have suffered the gravest injuries, with potentially lifelong aftereffects, may be limited by the damage cap,
while those who have relatively slight injuries may receive complete restitution for both the pecuniary and noneconomic damages they have suffered. Whether the ceiling limits recovery of
all damages or of only noneconomic reparations, inevitably such
classifications will deny some victims full compensation for their
injuries.
Faced with incomplete remedies and disparate treatment from
the legislature, victims whose recoveries have been restricted are
likely to challenge legislative caps in court both on tort liability
and on equal protection grounds. These equal protection challenges pose the most potent obstacle to effective tort liability
control. Yet, the evolving Supreme Court doctrine of equal protection, and analogously, the states' application of equal protection to legislative caps on medical malpractice liability, reveal
the features of a constitutionally permissible tort liability cap.
27.

See infra notes 54-55 and accompai:iying text.
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STANDARDS OF REVIEW UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION

Under the careful nurturance of the Supreme Court, the equal
protection doctrine is formulated upon a relatively simple premise: the "pledge of the protection of equal laws." 28 Concisely
stated, the "Constitution does not require that things different
in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. But it
does require, in its concern for equality, that those who are similarly situated be similarly treated." 29 Once known as the "last
resort" of constitutional arguments, 30 the equal protection doctrine has matured with time into one of the most vibrant doctrines of modern American jurisprudence. 31 Previously formulated by the Court as a two-tiered test, 32 the protections offered
by the fourteenth amendment have evolved into a multi-faceted
and potent tool of litigants. The broad interpretive powers available under the sliding scale of rationality have enabled many
courts to strike down damage limitations under the fourteenth
amendment.
A.

Strict Scrutiny

The most stringent standard of equal protection review is the
strict scrutiny test. Frequently described as "strict in theory and
fatal in fact," 33 the highest standard of review requires that the
legislative classification chosen be the least restrictive means
28. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341,
344 (1949); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.).
29. Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 28, at 344.
30. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
31. See, e.g., Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 986 (D. Kan. 1985) (invalidating
Kansas medical malpractice statute).
32. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 8 (1972). The two-tiered standard featured at one level the strict scrutiny test for
fundamental rights and suspect groups, and at the other level the rational relation test
for the remaining legislative acts in the social and economic field. The test was referred
to as outcome-determinative because the use of the strict scrutiny test invariably led to
invalidation of the challenged legislation, and the use of the deferential rational relation
test was sure to find the legislative action valid. Thus, whichever test the court initially
decided to apply to a given situation would be the determining factor in the review. See
also Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV.
981, 1030 (1979).
33. Gunther, supra note 32, at 8; see also Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 n.6
(1984) ("[o]nly rarely are statutes sustained in the face of strict scrutiny").
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possible in the promotion of a compelling state interest. 3 • The
exacting demands of strict scrutiny are reserved for two situations: first, when a legislative classification impinges upon a fundamental right; 36 and second, when distinctions are based upon
a "suspect" trait36 such as race,3 7 national origin, 38 or alienage. 39
Although the Court declares that legislation may survive strict
scrutiny,40 it appears that such a statement is simply a ritualistic
cleansing of the soul, because the Court invariably finds that the
impinging classifications fall short of the requisite degree of
merit. 41

B.

Intermediate Standard of Review

Dissatisfaction with the outcome-determinative results of the
traditional two-tiered test• 2 led the Supreme Court to define a
middle standard, the "intermediate" test. 43 Under this standard,
the court offers limited protection to groups that do not qualify
as a suspect class, yet are still deemed to be worthy of protection
34. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-6, at 1000-02 (1978).
35. Fundamental rights are "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
San Antonio lndep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973); see, e.g., Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969) (travel); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (association). Discovery of new
fundamental rights appears to be on the wane with the recent Supreme Court announcement that it was not "inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover
new fundamental rights," and therefore, "[t)here should be ... great resistance to expand the substantive reach of [the equal protection] clause." Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.
Ct. 2841, 2846 (1986) (holding that sexual preference is not a fundamental right).
36. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
37. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
38. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
39. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). But see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 630-44 (2d ed. 1983) (hereinafter J. NOWAK).
40. See L. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 16-6, at 1000.
41. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). There have
been only a handful of cases that have survived strict scrutiny. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding federal ceiling on individual contributions to political campaigns); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 687 (1973) (50 day durational voter residency
requirement "necessary" to promote the state's important interest in accurate voter
lists"); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973) (same); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding order excluding American citizens of Japanese origin
from designated West Coast military areas).
42. See Gunther, supra note 32, at 12.
43. See Perry, Modem Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79
CoLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1055 (1979); Note, Refining the Methods of Middle-Tier Scr~tiny:
A New Proposal for Equal Protection, 61 Tux. L. REV. 1501 (1983).

SUMMER

1987]

A Tort Liability Cap

1223

from the prejudicial excesses of society. 44 To withstand constitutional challenge, classifications involving "quasi-suspect" traits
"must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives."411 The
Court has rigidly limited its application of middle-tier scrutiny
to statutes that classify according to ad hominem traits such as
illegitimacy, alienage, or gender. 46

C.

A Sliding Scale of Rational Relation Scrutiny

In areas of social and economic regulation that do not involve
fundamental rights and suspect or quasi-suspect groups, the
Court has been uncertain about the extent of review it should
exercise under the fourteenth amendment. 47 The standard for
lowest-level review is generally refered to as "minimal rationality," under which a court will refuse to set aside social legislation
unless the complainant can show that the classification "is without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary."48 Im44. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (refusing to recognize the mentally retarded as a quasi-suspect group).
45. Compare Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (invalidating an Oklahoma
statute that prohibits sale of nonintoxicating beer to males under age 21 and to females
under age 18) with Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking
down a state policy excluding men from the university); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981) (upholding Selective Service Act requirement that only men register); Michael M.
v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (rejecting claim that California "statutory rape"
law fails equal protection if it only punishes male participants).
46. See Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 440-41. These classifications reflect "outmoded notions" of citizens with a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or citizens
who have been "subjected to unique disabilities ... not truly indicative of their abilities." Id. at 441 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgin, 427 U.S. 307, 313
(1976)). Because potential tort victims have not yet been identified, they cannot represent themselves to the public and legislature, and therefore, some argue, they are a
suppressed group deserving quasi-suspect protection. See Note, California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Protection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 829,
863 (1979). As Cleburne indicated, however, third parties can adequately protect powerless groups. In the case of potential tort victims, however, state legislatures and Congress
are composed largely of lawyers, who constitute one of the groups economically affected
by the liability limitations; thus, the interests of tort victims should be more than adequately voiced in the governing process. See also SB.I\dalow, The Distrust of Politics, 56
N.Y.U. L. REv. 446, 464-65 (1981) (examining the inherent problems of determining
which groups deserve "quasi-suspect" status, and which groups the political process adequately protects).
47. J. NowAK, supra note 39, at 591-98.
48. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911) (upholding a
state law regulating the uses of subterranean mineral water); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (upholding a state law that permitted only certain
merchants to sell merchandise, while forbidding vendors from selling the same goods);
Gunther, supra iiote 32, at 12.
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patient with the outcome-determinative results of the minimalist test, 0 however, the Court has concluded that not all cases
involving social legislation can fit within the confines of the
traditional rational relation test and still meet the standard of
fundamental fairness demanded by the equal protection clause. 60
As a result, the "heightened rationality" standard has emerged.
Under this test, courts no longer hypothesize any conceivable
legislative purpose, but demand that a "substantial relationship"
exist between the ends and means of the challenged statute. 111
The Supreme Court's application of the rationality tests indicates its adoption of a sliding scale of review that wavers between the minimal and heightened tests. Case law indicates that
depending upon the egregiousness of the factual circumstances
before it, the Court will employ a standard that "comprehends
variations in the degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending . . . on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected
and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the
particular classification is drawn." 52 Courts can employ, there49. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
50. See Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 990 (D. Kan. 1985) (concluding from
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) and Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470
U.S. 869 (1985) that the Supreme Court has adopted a new-but undeclared-test that
is distinct from the traditional rational basis test); L. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 16-5, at
999-1000.
51. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 416 (1920) (striking
down a state statute exempting local businesses that only do business outside of the
state from income taxes). The heightened rationality test envisions the court playing a
more active role in the formulation of social regulation. As Professor Gunther stated:
Putting consistent new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the
Court would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its imagination. It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture.
Gunther, supra note 32, at 21.
The courts will use their "teeth" in the heightened rational relation to exceed "the
conceivable basis standard by scrutinizing the state's asserted interest, the means selected to advance those interests, and the factual connection between the state's classification and the end." Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J.
1071, 1101 (1974). Therefore, by examining the conflicting interests and the means employed, the court utilizes a balancing test in order to protect those interests that are not
fundamental or suspect, but are still of enough importance to be found worthy of the
court's protection in certain circumstances. Linde, Due Process of Law Making, 55 NEB.
L. REV. 197, 208-09 (1976).
52. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 520 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("While we have in the past exercised our imaginations to conceive of possible
rational justifications for statutory classifications, we have recently declined to manufacture justifications in order to save an apparently invalid statutory classification." (citations omitted)); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (White, J., concurring) ("It is
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fore, either heightened rationality to ensure legislative precision
and responsibility, or minimal rationality to verify legislative enactments promulgated diligently and with accountability.~3

Ill.

COURT DECISIONS DECIDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE RECOVERY LIMITATIONS

Because legislatures have only recently adopted ceilings on
tort recovery, plaintiffs have not yet challenged the validity of
the statutes. State court perceptions of the equal protection doctrine involved in challenges to medical malpractice limitations
provide a guide to the present analysis of tort liability caps.
A majority of the courts considering the validity of the caps
on malpractice liability have found that the ceilings violate
equal protection principles.MA comparison of the decisions finding the limits unconstitutional with decisions finding the ceilings
clear that we employ not just one, or two, but ... a 'spectrum of standards.' "). Proof of
a heightened rationality test is built upon a growing base of precedent, while the Supreme Court continues to "lead[] court and counsel into a labyrinth of fictions" by refusing to acknowledge its existence. Linde, supra note 51, at 208; see, e.g., Cleburne, 473
U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance limiting homes for the mentally retarded); Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (striking down a state tax that imposed a higher rate upon
out of state companies); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding
invalid a statute that denied claimant a hearing); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628
(1974) (invalidating provision of Social Security Act); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) (disqualifying a provision of the federal food stamp program for assistance limited
to households composed of related persons); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (invalidating statute that required recoupment of legal expenses incurred in the defense of
indigent); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (striking down criminal sanctions for
the sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons).
53. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99, 127 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (objecting to lower
court's finding that education is not a fundamental right). For authors who have discerned the use of a sliding scale of rationality, see Bice, Standards of Judicial Review, 50
S. CAL. L. REV. 689, 700-01 (1977); Cohen, Is Equal Protection Like Oakland? Equality
as a Surrogate for Other Rights, 59 TUL. L. REV. 884 (1985); Linde, supra note 51, at 208;
Nowak, supra note 51, at 1101; O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The
Case of Equal Protection, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 19, 52 (1979); Wilkinson, The Supreme
Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and The Three Faces of Constitutional Equality,
61 VA. L. REV. 945, 954 (1975).
54. Several state courts have struck down caps on medical malpractice suits. See
Florida Medical Center v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds sub nom. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So.
2d 783 (Fla. 1985) (reversing lower court due to passage of remedial amendment during
appeal); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d
736 (1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio App. 3d 164, 355
N.E.2d 903 (1976); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983); Baptist Hosp. v. Baber,
672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
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valid 1111 reveals a set of common factors that were weighed in the
judicial balance. Analysis of these common factors discloses the
criteria that a legislature should meet when it drafts caps on tort
liability.

A.

Jurisdictions Holding Medical Malpractice Statutes
Unconstitutional on Equal Protection Grounds

The first challenge of a malpractice damage limitation statute
before a state high court was Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association. 116 In Wright, the plaintiff sought a declaratory
judgment against the constitutionality of the Illinois medical
malpractice statute. 117 The plaintiff sought judgment against a
section of the Act which provided that the maximum recovery
"on account of injuries" by reason of medical, hospital or other
healing art malpractice" was $500,000. The statute thus provided malpractice security for doctors and insurers by placing a
ceiling on the total economic and noneconomic damages recoverable by a victim.
The plaintiff asserted that the liability cap violated the equal
protection and due process guarantees of the Illinois and federal
constitutions. 118 Conversely, the defendant argued that the actions were within the province of proper legislative conduct, and
that the classifications were a necessary step in dealing with the
medical malpractice insurance crisis. 119
55. California, Indiana, and Nebraska courts have upheld caps on medical malpractice suits. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368,695
P.2d 665 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 462 So. 2d 149 (La.
1985); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
56. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
57. Section 401a of the Illinois Insurance Code, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, para. 1023a
(1975). This statute was subsequently repealed by Act approved Aug. 28, 1979, P.A. 81288, § 2, 1979 Ill. Laws 1442.
58. Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 325-26, 347 N.E.2d at 741. The plaintiff argued that the
legislative limitation was an arbitrary and unreasonably discriminatory classification because the state's efforts to minimize the growth of medical malpractice insurance premiums placed a harsh burden on severely injured victims who were most in need of financial protection, yet fully compensated malpractice victims who sustained relatively slight
injuries.
59. Id. The one step at a time formula was enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) ("(T)he reform may take one step at
a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind. The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy
there, neglecting the others."). See also Note, Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
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The standard of equal protection review used by the Wright
court in declaring the statute unconstitutional is not clearly discernable from the record. Although the court purportedly found
no rational basis for the legislative classification,60 the court's actions indicate that it employed a standard of scrutiny more exacting than mere deferential rationality. 61 The court weighed the
concerns of the legislature against the injustice of depriving a
victim of full economic compensation mandated under the common law without a quid pro quo. 62
As a result of this weighing, the court found the statutory
damage limitations unconstitutional. 63 Specifically, the court indicated its distaste for substantive limitations on economic damages: "[T]he very seriously injured malpractice victim, because
of the recovery limitation, might be unable to recover even all
the medical expenses he might incur."64 The legislature's statute
created arbitrary distinctions and was not rational. 611 The court
declared, furthermore, that although the plaintiff did not have a
vested right in a common law cause of action,66 her claim could
not be arbitrarily limited without a resultant quid pro quo. 67
The court rejected the defendant's assertion of a "societal" quid
pro quo, that "the loss of recovery potential to some malpractice
victims is offset by 'lower insurance premiums and lower medical
care costs for all recipients of medical care.' " 68 It stated that
these benefits did not extend to the seriously injured medical
malpractice victim. 69 By interweaving the equal protection analysis with the loss of a common law remedy, the court found the
60. Wright, 63 Ill. 2d at 330, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
61. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The deferential rationality standard
should always lead to a finding of constitutionality.
62. See Redish, Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis:
Constitutional Implications, 55 Tux. L. REV. 759, 789 (1977). The quid pro quo argument is based upon the fourteenth amendment in that by eliminating a remedy, without
providing a concomitant remedy, the legislature is acting in an irrational manner.
63. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313, 329-30, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743
(1976). Justice Underwood, in dissent, conceded that a stronger case for upholding the
statute would have been made if the $500,000 limitation had permitted full compensation for economic damages, and only limited noneconomic damages. Id. at 334, 347
N.E.2d at 746.
64. Id. at 327-28, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
65. Id. at 329, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
66. Id. at 327, 347 N.E.2d at 743.
67. Id. at 329, 347 N.E.2d at 743 ("[T]o the extent that recovery is permitted or
denied on an arbitrary basis a special privilege is granted in violation of the Illinois
Constitution.").
68. Id. at 328, 347 N.E.2d at 742.
69. Id.; see also Note, supra note 46, at 871 n.256 (1979) ("As a matter of logic, the
benefits of the legislation (reduced or maintained medical costs) would, of course, inure
to even the most severely injured patient. However, as evident in the Wright court's
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balance weighed in favor of the plaintiff. 70 The $500,000 limitation, consequently, denied recovery on an arbitrary basis and
constituted special legislation; on this basis, the court declared
the statute to be unconstitutional. 71
Because Illinois' Wright decision was the first state high court
pronouncement on the validity of malpractice liability caps,
commentators and courts widely analyzed and applied it. 72 Although the court's reasoning has been criticized, 73 many approve
of its results, 74 and its persuasive effect influenced later court
decisions.
The Idaho Supreme Court in Jones v. State Board of
Medicine 75 was the first court to openly use the heightened rationality standard. In deciding whether a provision of the Idaho
Hospital-Medical Liability Act76 violated state and federal equal
protection standards, 77 the court announced its support for the
heightened rationality standard and specifically refuted the notion of judicial restraint. 78
discussion of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the court focused on whether the statute's benefits were outweighed by the burdens it imposed.").
70. See Redish, supra note 62, at 789.
71. Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 330, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743
(1976). The constitutional protections afforded by the special law prohibition of the Illinois Constitution and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment are virtually identical. See, e.g., Chicago Nat'! League Ball Club v. Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357,
368, 483 N.E.2d 1245, 1255 (1985); McRoberts v. Adams, 60 Ill. 2d 458, 463, 328 N.E.2d
321, 324 (1975).
72. See, e.g., Note, Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Association: A Grim Prognosis For Medical Malpractice Review Panels?, 22 S.D.L. REV. 461, 465-66 (1977); Illinois
Supre'l}e Court Review-Constitutional Law-Medical Malpractice Statute Unconstitutional, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 298 [hereinafter Illinois Supreme Court Review]; Note, Medical
Malpractice Statute-Medical Malpractice Statute Declared Unconstitutional, 1977
Wis. L. REV. 203 [hereinafter Note, Statute Declared Unconstitutional].
73. See Redish, supra note 62; Illinois Supreme Court Review, supra note 72, at 31620; Note, Statute Declared Unconstitutional, supra note 72, at 221, 225-26.
74. See Illinois Supreme Court Review, supra note 72, at 320; Comment, Testing the
Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice Legislation: The Wisconsin Medical Malpractice Act of 1975, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 838, 869.
75. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
76. Id. at 862, 555 P.2d at 402. IDAHO CoDE § 39-4204 (1977) limited liability to
$150,000 per malpractice claim and $300,000 per malpractice occurrence.
77. Jones, 97 Idaho at 870, 555 P.2d at 410.
78. Id. at 871, 555 P.2d at 411 ("[B]lind adherence and over-indulgence results in
abdication of judicial responsibility."). Deferential equal protection was enunciated in
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961):
The constitutional safeguard [of equal protection] is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.

SUMMER

1987]

A Tort Liability Cap

1229

Noting the injustice of preventing full recovery to those most
seriously injured while conferring a benefit upon the doctors and
hospitals of the state, 79 the court adopted a means-oriented focus.80 The tribunal declared that when the challenged statutory
classification discriminates on its face, and no relationship exists
between the classification and the declared legislative purpose,
the court must bypass the minimum scrutiny test and apply a
heightened standard of review. 81 Consequently, the court ordered that the lower court factually determine whether the
"statute reflects any reasonably conceived public purpose, and
[whether] the establishment of the classification [has] a fair and
substantial relation to the achievement of the objective and
purpose. " 82
Subsequent court decisions holding malpractice recovery limitations unconstitutional combine the analyses of Jones and
Wright. 83 The state courts that have found the limitations unconstitutional have used a standard of review more exacting
than deferential rationality without explicitly announcing their
standard. s• Although these courts have concentrated on the factual nexus between legislative purpose and statutory means, an
implicit evaluation of the conflicting interests played a prominent role in the decisionmaking process. 811 The courts have balanced the governmental goals of assuring adequate health care
and lowering malpractice insurance costs against the interests of
79. "The classification which is thereby created distinguishes between those who are
damaged as a result of medical malpractice in amounts exceeding $150,000 as contrasted
with others likewise damaged by medical malpractice but whose damages are less than
$150,000." Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 870, 555 P.2d 399, 410, cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
80. Id. at 871, 555 P.2d at 411 ("That test scrutinizes the means by which the challenged legislation is said to affect its articulated and otherwise legitimate purpose.").
81. Id.
82. Id. The court relied on the standard set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
83. See Florida Medical Center v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (finding legislation violative of equal protection), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985); Carson
v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) (striking down the statute as a violation of
equal protection and failure to provide a quid pro quo); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125 (N.D. 1978) (holding the imposition of limitations unjustified by lack of evidence
supporting the existence of a crisis); Boucher v. Sayed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (finding
of no crisis did not support classification burden under equal protection); Baptist Hosp.
v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (utilizing the equal protection and quid
pro quo analysis to strike down the damage cap).
84. See, e.g., supra note 32 and accompanying text (traditional rationality defers to
legislative decisions); Redish, supra note 62, at 766; Smith, supra note 8, at 207 (1985).
85. See Smith, supra note 8, at 207; Note, supra note 46, at 880.
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the victims of medical malpractice. In each instance, the constitutional balance favored the victims who were denied economic
restitution; as a result, each statute was declared arbitrary and
not based upon a rational decision-making basis. 86

B. Jurisdictions Holding Liability Limitations Constitutional
Courts that have upheld malpractice liability limitations
against equal protection attacks have done so under the minimal
rational relation standard of review. 87 The first court to approve
malpractice damage restrictions was the Nebraska Supreme
Court in Prendergast v. Nelson. 88 The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment against the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability
Act, which places a $500,000 ceiling on damages. 89
The Nebraska court, using the minimal standard of review resorted to by other courts when examining social and economic
legislation, rejected the judicial activism of Wright. 00 Noting
that the legislature was "free to experiment and to innovate and
to do so at will, or even 'at [its] whim,' " 91 the court held that
the legislature's classifications properly ensured the preservation
of insurance coverage. Consequently, the court specifically sanctioned the state's right to address the malpractice insurance crisis in this fashion.
The Nebraska court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that
the legislature does not have the right to change common law
doctrines. The court declared that the legislature was not lim86. Florida Medical Center v. Von Stetina, 436 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina,
474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985) (reversing lower court due to passage of remedial amendment
during appeal); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313, 347
N.E.2d 736 (1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v.
Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio App.
3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (1976); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983); Baptist Hosp.
v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
87. See Smith, supra note 8, at 209.
88. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
89. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2821(2) (Supp. 1987). Under the statute, a claimant is able
to elect whether or not to be included within the statutory limitations prior to receiving
medical treatment. The majority relied substantially upon this factor. Nelson, 199 Neb.
at 101, 256 N.W.2d at 669. Justice White, in dissent, however, indicates that a patient
who is brought unconscious to the hospital does not have the power to elect under the
statute, and the power of the hospitals to deny medical treatment to those who do not
elect is a powerful coercive tool. Id. at 132, 256 N.W.2d at 676.
90. Nelson, 199 Neb. at 107, 256 N.W.2d at 676-77.
91. Id. at 114, 256 N.W.2d at 668 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)).
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ited by a judicial requirement that it ensure a quid pro quo
when redefining common law rights. 92
The California Supreme Court's ruling in Fein u. Permanente
Medical Group is indicative of the general tenor of recent decisions that have upheld legislative caps on liability. 93 The court
rejected the plaintiff's claim that the malpractice limitations on
noneconomic damages violated the equal protection doctrine, 94
and refused to endorse the requirement of a quid pro quo remedy or to adopt the heightened rationality standard of review for
social legislation. The court applied the minimal rationality
standard and justified the legislative classifications as an attempt to lower liability costs and to limit medical malpractice
insurance premiums. 9 ~ Central to the California court's decision
was the fact that the legislature had "placed no limits whatsoever on a plaintiff's right to recover for all of the economic, pecuniary damages-such as medical expenses or lost earnings-resulting from the injury."96 It distinguished contrary
decisions because "[w]ith only one exception, all of the invalidated statutes contained a ceiling which applied to both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages, and several courts-in reaching
their decisions-were apparently considerably influenced by the
potential harshness of a limit that might prevent an injured person from recovering his medical expenses. " 97
The court dismissed the plaintiff's argument in favor of a constitutionally mandated quid pro quo, and reaffirmed the legislature's right "to modify the scope and nature of such damages." 98
In addition, the court noted that the legislative steps to preserve
a viable medical malpractice insurance program had provided a
safety net by ensuring that patients who were injured would be
92. Id. at 106, 256 N.W.2d at 664-65 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876)):
A person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.
That is only one of the forms of municipal law, and is no more sacred than any
other. Rights of property which have been created by the common law cannot be
taken away without due process; but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be
changed at the will, or even at the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by
constitutional limitations. Indeed, the great office of statutes is to remedy defects in the common law as they are developed, and to adapt it to the changes of
time and circumstances.
93. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474
U.S. 892 (1985).
94. Id. at 157-58, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83, 695 P.2d at 679.
95. Id. at 157-59, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83, 695 P.2d at 679-80.
96. Id. at 159, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383, 695 P.2d at 680.
97. Id. at 161, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 695 P.2d at 682.
98. Id. (citing American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 204
Cal. Rptr. 671, 683 P.2d 670 (1984) holding that the statute providing for periodic payments of "future damages" does not violate due process or equal protection principles).
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able to receive some form of compensation. If the state had not
taken that step to limit liability awards, many doctors might be
forced to practice without insurance, thereby effectively denying
a victim complete economic or noneconomic compensation. 99

IV.

ANALYSIS OF STATE COURT DECISIONS

Although the state courts are split on the constitutionality of
medical malpractice liability ceilings, 100 a pattern emerges from
the decisions that helps to explain the final outcome rendered by
the respective courts. The standard of equal protection review,
the existence of a concomitant remedy, and the legal difference
between economic and noneconomic damages are the prominent
factors weighed by the courts.

A. Standard of Review
All of the courts that have examined the validity of the malpractice liability limitations under equal protection have used
some form of the rational relation test. 101 The results indicate
that tribunals evaluate the competing interests of groups affected by the legislation. 102 Courts have attempted to strike a
99. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 160, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 384,
695 P.2d 665, 681 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
100. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
101. See Learner, Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 143 (1981) (citing cases); see, e.g., Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825
(1980). Although the Carson court purported to use the intermediate standard, it appears that the court employed the heightened rational relation test. The court's named
standard is probably the result of widespread confusion over the difference between the
intermediate test, which applies to quasi-suspect groups, and the heightened rational
relation test. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 605 n.5 (11th Ed. 1985) ("the 'newer
equal protection' theory is not the same as the 'intermediate' scrutiny developed in the
modern cases for some quasi-suspect classifications such as gender.").
102. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting); see also Linde, supra note 51, at 208:
[It is] stressed that the reviewing court should concentrate on the rationality of
the means without disturbing the legislative choice of ends. Still, although it
purports to leave policy choices to the political process, the test depends on
holding the law to some objective other than the immediate effect of the law
itself. Thus it forces litigants to debate the ostensible or assumed goal of a policy
as much as the likelihood that the goal will be reached by means of the challenged law. And the effort to phrase this debate as a scrutiny of reasons rather
than of values-of rationality rather than legitimacy-leads court and counsel
into a labyrinth of fictions.
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balance between the state goals of providing adequate health
care and lowering malpractice insurance costs and ensuring the
interests of the malpractice victim. 103 Depending upon how a
majority of a court views the succeeding balance, the court has
employed either heightened rationality to strike down the legislation, 104 or minimal rationality to sustain the liability
limitations. 1011

B.

Recovery Limitations

The determining factor in each validity of malpractice liability
limitations decision has been whether the cap limits economic or
noneconomic damages. Without expressly stating why economic
damages are considered to be fundamentally more important
than noneconomic damages, courts have given the respective
damage types different weights.
1. Judicial recognition of economic damages as a quasi-fundamental right- Courts that have declared that statutory caps
violative of the equal protection clause have emphasized the
presence of a limitation on economic damages. 106 These courts
clearly exhibit the hostility of the judiciary to a statute that
could prevent an innocent victim from recovering even the pecuniary losses suffered as a result of another party's negligent actions.107 Although the goal is to place victims back in their original positions, denial of economic losses has the inequitable
result of preventing the victim from recovering even the most
basic building block in the remedial process. Consequently, the
courts have found that the legislative goal of limiting economic
damages does not justify the seemingly arbitrary results. 108
Compensatory recovery for economic injuries incurred through
the fault of another is not considered a fundamental right. 109
103. See Note, supra note 46, at 880 for a detailed discussion of the various decisions.
104. See supra text accompanying note 90.
105. See supra text accompanying note 91.
106. See supra note 86. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980) is aberrant as the only decision striking down a statute that limited solely noneconomic
damages.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 68 and 83. ·
108. See supra note 86.
109. See Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981); Estate of Cargill v. City of
Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 406 A.2d 704 (1979), appeal dismissed, 445 U.S. 921 (1980);
Johnson v. Saint Vincent Hosp., 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Jones v. State Bd.
of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1976); State
ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
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Yet, it is nonetheless viewed as "an important substantive
right. "ll 0 When a salient value exists within a substantial nexus
to interests implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, a majority of the Supreme Court has been willing to designate these values as quasi-fundamental rights.m To provide adequate protection for these preferred values, the Court employs
a standard beyond the traditional confines of the rationality
test, which is attested to by the rise of the heightened rationality
test within the context of equal protection. 112
Under the auspices of equal protection the individual is secure
from deprivation of those liberties "long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by men. "ll 3
As the Supreme Court stated in Ingraham v. Wright:
Among the historic liberties so protected was a right to
be free from, and to obtain judicial relief for, unjustified
intrusions on personal security.
While the contours of this historic liberty interest in
the context of our federal system of government have not
been defined precisely, they always have been thought to
encompass freedom from bodily restraint and
punishment. n•
110. Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 994 (D. Kan. 1985); Learner, supra note
101; see Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
111. L. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 15-9, at 919-20, § 16-31, at 1089-92; Linde, supra
note 51, at 208. For general examples of the use of heightened rationality, see City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating a zoning ordinance
that limited homes for the mentally retarded); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470
U.S. 869 (1985) (striking down a state tax that imposed a higher rate upon out of state
companies); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (holding invalid a statute that denied claimant a hearing); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974) (invalidating local school board requirement that pregnant teachers take unpaid
maternity leaves of several months); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974) (invalidating provision of Social Security Act); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that education is a fundamental
right); USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (striking down a provision of the federal
food stamp program limiting assistance to households composed of related persons);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458 (1973) (striking down irrebuttable presumption of
out-of-state residence for those whose legal address is outside the state) (White, J., concurring); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (invalidating criminal sanctions for the
sale of contraceptives to unmarried persons); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (invalidating statute that enabled state to recoup expenses incurred in legal defense of
indigents).
112. This trend is undeniable, as exhibited in the Supreme Court decisions cited
supra note 111 and in the state court decisions discussed in the text accompanying supra
notes 83-86 that have emulated the trend. See L. TRIBE, supra note 34, § 16-32, at 1082;
Gunther, supra note 32, at 12; Linde, supra note 51, at 208.
113. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
114. 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977).
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A fundamental precept of societal law, stretching back to the
earliest forms of societal justice, is the right to be free from unwarranted bodily invasion. 1111 When viewed in conjunction with
judicial protection of rights central to personal privacy, "the
rights to personal security and bodily integrity, and corresponding rights to relief from invasions thereof, are logically encompassed by this constitutional interpolation." 116 Consequently,
the courts view preservation of full compensatory damages as an
interest unable to attain the stringent protections provided a
fundamental right, yet it is still deserving of more protection
than is traditionally accorded to values examined under the
minimal rational relation test. Because economic damages form
the cornerstone of the attempt to return victims to the position
they held prior to their accidents, the judiciary considers the
preservation of economic damages to carry the weight of a quasifundamental right. Thus, the courts will examine closely legislative means and goals to ensure that majoritarian liability limitations do not unduly impinge upon the valued rights of an inadequately represented minority. 117
2. Judicial scrutiny of noneconomic damages under the
minimal rationality test- Courts have held that legislation limiting only noneconomic damages does not affront the constitutional principles of equal protection. 118 Because awards for pain
and suffering and other nonpecuniary damages are not fundamental rights under the Constitution, 119 and are not considered
to be as integral to physical recovery as economic damages, the
courts have recognized that "the Legislature possesses broad au115.
And if men strive together, and one smite another with a stone, or with his fist,
and he die not, but keepeth his bed;
If he rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him
be quit: only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be
thoroughly healed.
Exodus, 21:18-19; see also Woodbine, The Origins of the Action of Trespass (pts. 1 & 2),
33 YALE L.J. 799 (1924), 34 YALE L.J. 343 (1925); Deiser, The Development of Principle
in Trespass, 27 YALE L.J. 220 (1917).
116. Learner, supra note 101, at 191; see Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
117. See generally J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (advocating the use of
"representation-reinforcing" model in constitutional adjudication for the protection of
minority interests within a majoritarian government).
118. See Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983 (D. Kan. 1985); Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d 665 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); see also Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d
313, 332, 347 N.E.2d 736, 745 (1976) (Underwood, J., dissenting).
119. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
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thority to modify the scope and nature of such damages." 120 The
wisdom of noneconomic damage awards, as for pain and suffering, has frequently faced critical review by jurists and legal
scholars. 121 The noneconomic damage award has become a wellestablished remedy, but courts have not accorded it the same
deference as pecuniary damages. Although economic costs are
viewed as integral to physical recovery, noneconomic damages
are not essential to recovery or are so speculative that their relative value is diminished. Critics of nonpecuniary damages note
that "the law relating to damages for pain and suffering in personal injury cases is extremely uncertain and the outcome of its
application by juries and courts is highly unpredictable." 122 In
the absence of definitive principles to guide courts and juries,
detractors believe that "money damages are at best only imperfect compensation for such intangible injuries and . . . such
damages are generally pass·ed on to, and borne by, innocent
consumers. " 123
Because noneconomic damages are highly speculative, the
courts will not accord limitations on noneconomic damages the
same weight or value accorded to limitations on the more defined and objective economic damages. 12• State courts base their
actions upon the sliding scale of rationality and are more willing
to find a rational basis for the noneconomic limitations, as opposed to the economic restraints, by deferring to legislative initiatives to curb the lesser-valued pain and suffering costs in order to solve a perceived crisis "one step at a time." 1211
120. Permanente, 38 Cal. 3d at 157, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 382, 695 P.2d at 680 (citing
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hosp., 36 Cal. 3d 359, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671, 683
P.2d 670 (1984)).
121. See generally Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18
LAW & CoNTEMP. Paoas. 219 (1958); Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 CoLUM.
L. REV. 476 (1959); Plant, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 200 (1958);
Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27 (1954). Originally
courts employed "pain and suffering" in legal actions as a form of punitive damages to
prevent retaliation by the victim's family. O'Connell & Bailey, The History of Payment
For Pain & Suffering, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 83. Courts have recognized pain and suffering
since the mid-1800's as a common damage remedy in negligence suits. Id. at 94; see also
Seifert v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 56 Cal. 2d 498, 511, 15 Cal. Rptr. 161, 169, 364 P.2d
337, 345 (1961) (Traynor, J., dissenting).
122. Plant, supra note 121, at 210.
123. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 159, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 384,
695 P.2d 665, 680-81 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
124. Id.; see also Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 992-93 (D. Kan. 1985).
125. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 695 P.2d
665 (en bane), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985); Johnson~- St. Vincent Hosp., 273
Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980); Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657
(1977).
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Quid Pro Quo

The second consideration in the judicial balancing act has
been whether a quid pro quo is constitutionally mandated in order to protect malpractice victims from the arbitrary limitations
of the legislature. 126 Although the courts have denied that an alternative remedy is a prerequisite to proper legislative abrogation of common law actions, 127 they have relied on the "presence
or absence of a quid pro quo to the disadvantaged class as a
factor in their determination." 126 Thus, when legislatures couple
the loss of a malpractice remedy with the potentially harsh results of a limitation on economic damages, courts find the scales
tip in favor of the victimized plaintiff.
In contrast, a number of courts have either rejected the necessity of a quid pro quo or found that the legislative actions preserve a remedy for malpractice victims. The California court in
Fein u. Permanente Medical Group 129 found a legislative intent
to provide a quid pro quo by ensuring that doctors were able to
afford malpractice insurance. The court found that victims
might be unable to recover funds sufficient to cover their medical expenses from negligent doctors who lacked insurance. 130
The Wright court's contrary holding was flawed, in that the
court refused to recognize that the societal benefit of reduced
medical costs may enure to a victim who has previously paid
lower insurance premiums, and she may receive medical treatment for her injuries at a reduced cost. 131
126. See supra notes 58-89 and accompanying text.
127. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978); Wright
v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 328-31, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742-743 (1976);
Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 942-43, 424 A.2d 825, 837-38 (1980); Arneson v. Olson,
270 N.W.2d 125, 134-35 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio
Misc. 2d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903, 909-10 (C.P. Montgomery County 1976); see also Redish,
supra note 62, at 785; Witherspoon, Constitutionality of the Texas Statute Limiting
Liability for Medical Malpractice, 10 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 419, 463 (1976).
128. Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
129. 38 Cal. 3d at 160 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.18, 695 P.2d at 682 n.18 (en bane),
appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
130. Id. at 158, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383, 695 P.2d at 680. The logic of the court is readily
apparent. With the average medical malpractice jury award being $950,000, see Senate
Hearing, supra note 4, at 33 (statement of William Wyer, U.S. Chamber of Commerce),
very few doctors will be able to pay the enormous damages that are awarded to malpractice victims. The rationale behind the existence of insurance is to prevent the burden
from falling solely upon one person. Instead, it is economically efficient to spread the
cost across the boundaries of society. Therefore, if affordable insurance coverage is not
preserved, the end result will be that in many cases the negligent party will not be able
to pay the costs meant to reimburse the plaintiff, or will be financially destroyed.
131. See Note, supra note 46, at 871 n.256.

1238

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 20:4

Consequently, the judicial decisions reflect a burgeoning uncertainty over whether an alternative remedy is a prerequisite to
legislative restriction of common law remedies. Those courts
that did not reject the issue out of hand have still hesitated to
rely solely on the absence of a quid pro quo to justify their action against legislative restriction. 132 Apparently, the courts' indecision reflects their concern that adoption of the quid pro quo
doctrine could significantly hamper the legislative power to effect social change. A judicial requirement that the legislature
formulate a "reasonable substitute" every time that it abrogates
or modifies obsolete common law rights would effectively restrict
legislative initiatives in the legal field. "Moreover, by immunizing common-law rights from total abrogation, the doctrine effectively raises common-law causes of action to the level of constitutional rights, a status they were never intended to have." 133 A
basic element of common law development is its amoebic ability
to penetrate or recede according to the evolving values of society. Limiting the evolution of the common law by a judicially
mandated quid pro quo would stymie both the state's ability to
act as a social laboratory, and the creative potential of the common law. 134
The presence or absence of a quid pro quo may therefore
carry some weight in the final judicial decision. Yet, in the face
of judicial illegitimacy and the countervailing system's interest,
the courts have not found the absence of a quid pro quo to be in
itself a determinative factor. 1311 A statute which solely limits
noneconomic damages, therefore, will not be invalidated under
the quid pro quo argument.

D.

Summary

In order to establish a valid statute, a legislature must work
within the confines of modern equal protection jurisprudence. 136
The judicial positions reveal a series of common factors that are
determinative in the final outcome. The paramount factor in the
equation is the judicial decision to adopt a sliding scale of rationality. Sensitive to the erratic path set forth by the Supreme
132. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
133. Redish, supra note 62, at 787.
134. See id. at 787.
135. See Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); see also J.
ELY, supra note 117.
136. See generally Tussman and tenBroeck, supra note 28.
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Court, state courts have emulated the varying levels of scrutiny
employed by the Court in its equal protection analysis. The new
attitude indicates that independent of the legislative will, in certain contexts, the judiciary will scrutinize and weigh the conflicting interests at issue. This freedom provides the court with a
tool to ensure that judicially prized values will be dealt with by
the legislatures in the rational manner contemplated by the
principles underlying the Constitution.
Legislation limiting tort damages will inevitably discriminate
between severely injured tort victims, who will not be fully compensated, and those with relatively slight injuries, who will be
fully recompensed. The judiciary has weighed the legislative
goals and means utilized to assure affordable insurance coverage
against the interests of the injured parties. Courts have refused
to validate restraints that limit the victims's quasi-fundamental
right to full recovery of economic damages, without the existence
of a concomitant quid pro quo. In contrast, the subjective value
of noneconomic damages has not weighed as heavily on the judicial scales. In such cases, the courts are willing to defer to legislative attempts to solve the liability crisis by limiting the
amount of noneconomic damages that a victim may recover.
Consequently, to remain viable under the strictures of the
equal protection doctrine, a restraint on damages must only
limit noneconomic damages. Any attempt to limit a victim's recovery of economic damages is simply an invitation for judicial
intervention, and a declaration that the statute is an arbitrary
act without rational basis.

V.

MODEL STATUTE TO LIMIT TORT LIABILITY

This Note proposes a statute with a constitutionally valid limitation upon noneconomic damages. It employs a straight limitation in order to avoid possible confusion and collateral considerations. Because the ceiling figure is basically arbitrary, 137 the
proposed statute leaves the figure to the determination of the
legislators. Studies indicate, however, that any figure exceeding
$100,000 will compensate the vast majority of people for their
noneconomic injuries, and concurrently function to provide an
objective basis for insurance companies to determine their future costs and corresponding insurance rates. 138
137. See supra note 24.
138. Id.
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In addition to the general verdict on negligence, a special interrogatory is required by the statute. 139 Special interrogatories
are used to emphasize important points and prevent the jury
from acting on the basis of bias. 140 The interrogatories ensure
strict separation of objective economic damages and subjective
noneconomic damages. A court is responsible for explaining the
differences between economic and noneconomic damages and
preparing detailed questions to ensure strict control of the
jury. 141 It thereby prevents potentially sympathetic jurors from
inflating economic awards in order to compensate for lost
noneconomic damages.
Judicial review of the jury award is mandated to ensure that
the jury faithfully fulfills its duties. Remittitur is provided for in
the statute to allow judicial action on excessive verdicts. 142 "It is
a universal rule . . . that a remittitur may not be granted by a
court in lieu of a new trial unless consented to by the party 'unfavorably affected thereby.' " 143 Yet the judicial discretion to
grant a new trial conditioned upon the acceptance of the remittitur is a powerful tool. 144
In the federal system additur is unconstitutional, 1411 however,
state law may allow it in restricted circumstances. 146 To ensure
that judges retain the power to order just compensation when
the jury award is clearly at odds with the findings of the special
interrogatories, the proposed statute will permit additur under
strictly controlled circumstances for economic damages, yet deny
increases in noneconomic damages that would exceed the statutory limitation.
139. The other elements of the statute are utilized to ensure strict compliance with
the damage limitations. The authorities cited supra note 6 may be consulted for additional information on each element presented in the Model Statute.
140. See Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253 (1920):
The special verdict compels detailed consideration. But above all it enables the
public, the parties and the court to see what the jury really has done. . . . [T]he
special verdict enables errors to be localized so that the sound portions of the
verdict may be saved and only the unsound portions be subject to redetermination through a new trial.
Id. at 259.
141. See C. WRIGHT, LAW or FEDERAL CouRTS 630-33 (4th ed. 1983).
142. See generally Comment, Remittitur Practice in the Federal Courts, 76 CoLUM.
L. REV. 299 (1976).
143. United States v. 93.970 Acres of Land, 258 F.2d 17, 30 (7th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 947 (1959); see, e.g., 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2816 (1973).
144. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935).
145. Id. at 487 (holding additur to be a violation of the right to jury trial).
146. See Yep Hong v. Williams, 6 Ill. App. 2d 456, 128 N.E.2d 655 (1955); 11 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 143, § 2816.
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MODEL STATUTE
SECTION 1: SHORT TITLE
This Act shall be known and may be cited as Model
Tort Liability Limitation Act.
SECTION 2: SCOPE
This Act shall apply to all personal injury actions involving either physical or mental harm, disease, sickness, and death.
SECTION 3: DEFINITIONS
For purposes of this Act, the subsequent terms are
defined as follows:
(1) "Economic damages" are objectively verifiable pecuniary losses, including, but not limited to, medical
expenses, loss of earnings, cost of replacement or repair of property, cost of obtaining limited substitute
services, burial costs, and loss of business or employment opportunities that are grounded in substantial
actuality. The term "economic damages" shall be narrowly construed by the courts.
(2) "Noneconomic damages" are subjective, nonpecuniary losses, including, but not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of dignity,
physical disability or disfigurement, emotional distress, loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, and damage to the parent-child relationship.
SECTION 4: SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES
(1) Any judgment or verdict rendered by a trier of fact
which determines that liability exists o"n the part of
the defendant(s) shall include specific findings of the
following damage awards:
(a) Prior economic damages of claimant;
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(b) Future economic damages of claimant, including,
but not limited to:
(i) Medical and other costs of health care of
claimant; and
(ii) Lost wages or lost earning capacity of claimant; and
(iii) Cost of replacement or repair of property;
(c) All noneconomic damages of the claimant.
(2) When indicating the monetary sums intended to
compensate the claimant for future losses under subsections ( 1 )(b )(i) and (ii), the trier of fact shall state
the time period for which such sums are intended to
provide compensation.
(3) The future damages itemized under subsections
(l)(b) shall be computed to reflect present value.
SECTION 5: JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DAMAGE
AWARDS
In any action to which this Act applies, wherein the
trier of fact finds the defendant(s) liable, and a verdict
is rendered that awards pecuniary restitution to the
plaintiff(s), the court shall be responsible, upon proper
motion of either party, for reviewing the sum of the
award to determine if the award is excessive or inadequate in light of the facts presented to the jury, and if
the award could be adduced in a logical manner by
reasonable persons. Without exception, in all circumstances the provisions of section 6 shall not be overruled by the provisions of section 5. All judicial actions
pursuant to this section must be entered on a written
record by the court.
SECTION 6: LIMITATION OF NONECONOMIC
DAMAGES
In any action to which this Act applies, a plaintiff
who has been awarded damages for noneconomic
losses, as defined in Section 3(b ), shall not recover
monetary sums in excess of$ [insert amount].
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SECTION 7: EFFECTIVE DATE
Actions subject to this Act shall apply to all claims
that accrue after the effective enactment date of this
Act.
-Richard S. Kuhl

